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Abstract
We find that new firms’ real investment responds much more elastically to
aggregate Tobin’s Q than does that of established firms. On the financial side,
IPOs respond more elastically to Tobin’sQ than seasoned oﬀerings of securities.
The explanation seems to be that a high aggregate Q raises new firms’ desired
investment much more than it raises the desired investment of incumbents. For
the period from 1955 to 2001, the Q-elasticity of IPOs is about 1.2, and the
elasticity of new-firms’ investment is about 0.7. These are about 20 times
more than is usual in Q regressions. On the other hand, the Q-elasticity of
seasoned oﬀerings is actually negative (-0.05), and the elasticity of incumbents’
investment is 0.04. Though not statistically significant, the average of these
estimates is even smaller than is usual.
1 Introduction
A firm’s initial public oﬀering on the stock market — its “IPO” — represents a transfer
of ownership of the firm and its assets into the hands of the public, at least in part. At
the same time an IPO also augments the funds available to the firm thereby enabling
the firm to invest more. Thus an IPO plays the dual role of (i) reallocating ownership
of existing assets and (ii) enabling the acquisition of new assets (Choe, Masulis and
Nanda 1993, Lowry 2002, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002).
If one purpose of an IPO is to raise investment funds, then perhaps neoclassical
investment theory — Q theory — can explain some aspects of the behavior of IPOs.
That is the aim of this paper. If it is to explain IPOs, however, Q-theory must also
explain why IPOs respond to Q more elastically than aggregate investment does,
a fact that emerges from Figure 1. The solid line shows the de-trended ratio of
the value of new stock-market listings to gross private domestic investment. The
dashed line is the de-trended ratio of stock market capitalization (MCAP) to gross
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Figure 1: De-trended new stock-market listings relative to gross private domestic
investment and de-trended stock market capitalization relative to GDP, 1886-2001.
domestic product (GDP), which is highly correlated with Q (our de-trended micro-
based estimates of Q from 1955 to 2001 have a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.79 with
de-trended MCAP/GDP). Business cycle recessions as dated by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) are shaded.1 The value of new equity listings was
largest in the decade surrounding 1900, around 1915, the late 1920’s, at the end of
the Second World War, in the late 1960s, the mid-1980s, and throughout the 1990s.
1The stock market data are from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP) files for 1925-2001. NYSE firms are available in CRSP continuously, AMEX firms
after 1961, and NASDAQ firms after 1971. We extended the CRSP stock files backward from their
1925 starting year by collecting year-end observations from 1885 to 1925 for all common stocks
traded on the NYSE. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001a, p. 1-2) describe these data in detail. New
listings are given by the total year-end market value of firms that entered our extended CRSP
database in each year, excluding American Depository Receipts (ADR’s). Gross private domestic
investment in current dollars is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2002, Table 1, pp. 123-4) for
1929-2001, to which we ratio splice the gross capital formation series in current dollars, excluding
military expenditures, from Kuznets (1961b, Tables T-8 and T-8a) for 1885-1929. GDP is from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2002, table 1, pp. 123-24) for 1929-2001, Kendrick (1961, table A-IIb,
cols. 4 and 11, pp. 296-97) for 1889-1929, and Berry (1988, table 9, pp. 25-26) for 1885-1889.
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Figure 2: The ratio of new listings to stock market capitalization relative to the ratio
of private domestic investment to GDP, 1886-2001.
This wave-like activity is also highly correlated with MCAP/GDP, as evidenced by a
correlation coeﬃcient of 0.62 for the de-trended series.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of new stock-market listings to market capitalization
relative to the investment rate.2 The same entry waves appear here as in Figure 1,
but the rate of entering capital to the market is even larger in the first half of the
20th century using this measure.
Empirical findings.–Real investment waves are less dramatic than IPO waves.3
2We construct the net capital stock using the private fixed assets tables of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2002) for 1925-2001. Then, using the estimates of the net stock of non-military capital
from Kuznets (1961a, Table 3, pp. 64-5) in 1869, 1879, 1889, 1909, 1919, and 1929 as benchmarks,
we use the percent changes in a synthetic series for the capital stock formed by starting with the
1869 Kuznets (1961a) estimate of $27 billion and adding net capital formation in each year through
1929 from Kuznets (1961b) to create an annual series that runs through the benchmark points.
Finally, we ratio-splice the resulting series for 1886-1925 to the later BEA series.
3This is probably because IPOs and seasoned issues entail high fixed costs, as does issuing
corporate bonds and bank loans (Lee et al. 1996). Firms therefore finance their real investments
out of retained earnings.
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This is mainly because IPOs raise capital for new firms, and new firms have on average
accounted for only 8.1 percent of real investment from 1886 to 2001. “Seasoned” issues
of shares by incumbent firms are imperfectly correlated with IPOs, with a correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.75. New capital (real and financial expansions of new firms) is more
pro-cyclical than incumbent capital: New capital responds far more to movements in
(aggregate) Tobin’s Q.4 Incumbent real capital responds to Q hardly at all.
About the model.–The evidence seems to fit a “putty-clay” type of view that
assembling an operation from scratch is cheaper than adding to existing operations
piecemeal.5 This is an “Ak” growth model in which capital is homogeneous but in
which there are two ways of adding to it: via incumbent firms, and via new firms.
The two modes of investment entail diﬀerent adjustment costs. We assume that IPOs
are the means by which new firms finance their investments. Our model expresses a
modified putty-clay hypothesis in terms of adjustment costs: These costs are flatter
for entering firms than for incumbents, and this explains (or at least accounts for)
the more elastic response of entering capital to variations in Q. The model also has
growth implications. A lower cost of entering capital raises the long-run growth rate
of the economy. This makes the model potentially interesting for understanding how
growth is linked to finance.
Literature.–In several papers, Ritter (1984), e.g., documents facts about IPOs.
Using partial equilibrium models, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001b) and Pastor and
Veronesi (2003) try to explain IPOs via fundamentals.
2 Model
LetK denote a firm’s capital stock. This is the only input in production which means
that we are not distinguishing physical from human capital. The firm’s output is
output = z1K. (1)
The firm’s investment is X and its capital stock follows the law of motion
K 0 = (1− δ)K +X. (2)
Adjustment costs.–There are two adjustment costs: one for entrants, and one for
incumbents. An incumbent’s adjustment cost is
C (x)K, where x = XK , (3)
4This finding is not new. Boddy and Gort (1971) find that the fraction of investment going to
new plants rises in booms. DeJong and Ingram (2001) find that young people leave school earlier in
booms.
5Cummins and Dey (1998), Gort and Lee (2002), and Gandal, Kende & Rob (1997) oﬀer empirical
support for the putty clay view. Recent models with putty-clay elements are Campbell (1998),
Gilchrist and Williams (2000), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) and Yorukoglu (1998).
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whereas an entrant’s adjustment cost is
C∗ (x)K.
Shocks.–There are two shocks in the model. The first, z1, is the common multi-
plicative shock to each firm’s production function (1). The second, z2, is a common
shock to the creative margin of the economy which we shall describe later. The shocks
follow the Markov process
Pr {zt+1 ≤ z0 | zt = z} = F (z0, z) . (4)
We shall be more explicit about this process later.
Valuation of risky income streams.–The pair (z1, z2) ≡ z aﬀects aggregate con-
sumption and, hence, the marginal utility of consumption and, hence, today’s value
of next-period’s consumption. As is customary in asset pricing models, imagine a
state-contingent price of consumption next period to be p (z, z0).6
3 The investment decision
Incumbents.–The price of capital is unity. The firm’s capital stock is given, and so
maximizing total value is the same as maximizing value per unit of capital. Because
returns to scale are constant, this value does not depend on the firm’s size. Its profit
per unit of capital is z −C (x)− x. An incumbent’s market value per unit of capital
is
Q (z) = max
x≥0
{z − C (x)− x+ (1− δ + x)Q∗ (z)} , (5)
where
Q∗ (z) =
Z
p (z, z0)Q (z0) dF (z0; z) (6)
is the discounted expected unit value of capital in the next period. The first-order
condition for the incumbent’s investment rate, x, is
C 0 (x) = Q∗ (z)− 1. (7)
Entrants.–We normalize the firm’s pre-entry level of capital at K0.7 This is the
capital that the firm’s founder has (e.g., in his garage) before taking the firm public.8
6It is given in (10) below and derived in Appendix 1. The economywide states will be the triple
(z1, z2,K) , but K will not aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in adjacent
periods.
7Campbell (1998) assumes that a firm’s initial size is exogenously fixed, and this is exactly what
we do here. This allows us to talk about the entrant’s adjustment costs on the same footing as
those of incumbents.
8We analyze the pre-IPO period in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001b), and so do Pastor and
Veronesi (2003).
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Assume that K0 does not produce output at all. Let Y denote the investment of an
entering firm and let
y = YK0
.
Then y solves the equation
max
y≥0
{−C∗ (y)− y + (1− δ + y)Q∗ (z)} (8)
so that the first-order condition is
C∗0 (y) = Q∗ (z)− 1. (9)
Preferences.–Preferences are
E0
∞X
t=0
βtU (ct) .
We assume they are homothetic, which means that K will not aﬀect the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption at diﬀerent dates, so that
βU
0 (c0)
U 0 (c) = p (z, z
0) , (10)
which we have used in (6). The household’s savings problem and the associated
equilibrium condition linking savings to investment is discussed in Appendix 1.
The birth process for new firms.–A firm owes its existence to an idea that defines
it. Let n be the number of new firms and the number of new ideas. Suppose that n
is proportional to the stock of capital:9
n = z2K. (11)
This means that the total investment of entering firms is
nyK0 = (z2K) yK0,
and the total adjustment costs are
nC∗ (y)K0 = (z2K)C∗ (y)K0.
We shall assume that z2 is Markovian too and independent of z1 conditional on their
past. That is, if F 1 (·) and F 2 (·) are the transition functions, in (4) we have
F (z0, z) = F 1 (z01, z1)F 2 (z02, z2) .
9Of course K derives its origin from existing ideas so that n depends, indirectly, on all previous
n’s. Therefore ideas build on previous ideas, roughly as in Romer (1990). When accumulating K,
firms do not take into account its productivity in generating new ideas n. Therefore, equilibrium
will not solve the planning problem, and growth will be slower than optimal.
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4 Equilibrium
Because returns toK are constant, the distribution of capital among incumbents does
not matter. Only its total amount, K does. Let c be consumption. The resource
constraint is c
K = z1 − x− z2yK0 − C (x)− z2C
∗ (y)K0
and the law of motion for the capital stock reads
K 0 = (1− δ + x+ z2yK0)K.
The two investment rates x and y solve (7) and (9). These latter two equations contain
Q∗, which is defined in (5) and (6). Finally, (10) must hold. This guarantees that
savings will equal investment. This part of the equilibrium is developed in Appendix
1, leading up to (24).
The equilibrium is not optimal. A partial result in Appendix 2 shows that at least
for states z in which x (z) > δ, equilibrium growth is too low relative to the social
optimum. That is a suﬃcient condition, and the converse is not necessarily true.
5 Example
Let γ > 1 and let µ > 1. Assume that
C (x) = xγ , and C∗ (y) = yµ.
Then the first-order conditions read
γxγ−1 = Q∗ − 1,
and
µyµ−1 = Q∗ − 1.
Rearranging, the two conditions reduce to
x = 1γ (Q
∗ − 1)1/(γ−1) (12)
and
y = 1µ (Q
∗ − 1)1/(µ−1) . (13)
We shall produce evidence that γ is much higher than µ.
The number of IPOs.–The eﬀect of Q∗ on y is not matched by an eﬀect on the
number of IPOs, n. From (5) we see that Q is not related to K which means from
(11) that Q will not aﬀect n either. Any relation between n and Q in the model will
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emerge only through the eﬀect that z2 may have on on K 0 and on the equilibrium
interest rate, and, hence, on Q∗. We don’t have the result in general, but when z is
constant, equations (14) and (19) imply that the relation is negative across steady
states. A further test of the model, then, is that Q and the number of IPOs, n, should
be negatively correlated.
6 Empirics
To estimate (12) and (13), we will work with three measures of x and y, two ways of
measuring Q∗, and two partially overlapping time periods.
6.1 Regressions with firm-level data
In the first set of regressions, we measure x as the sum of total changes in the year-
end gross capital stock among incumbents in the Compustat database divided by the
sum of their net capital stocks. We denote this measure of x by xreal. It is thus a
value-weighted average of X/K in the model. For y, we use the average year-end real
net capital stock of firms that entered the CRSP database in each year.10 We denote
this measure by yreal. This method assumes that the firm accumulates all of its initial
capital at the time of IPO.11 Since y in the model is normalized by the firm’s pre-IPO
capital stock, K0, and we do not have data on these stocks, we assume them to be
constant across firms and over time in building yreal and in the subsequent empirical
work. Our data cover the period from 1955 to 2001, which corresponds to the period
for which we can compute a continuous series for average Q using Compustat. Since
the liquidity of the capital market is often considered a key determinant of firm-level
investment, we also estimate specifications that include the ex-post inflation-adjusted
rate of return on three-month commercial paper.
Figure 3 shows xreal and yreal with recessions as dated by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) shaded. IPOs fall during four of the seven NBER
recessions, and all three since 1980, but behave countercyclically in the 1956-57 and
10The gross and net capital stocks are Compustat data items 7 and 8 respectively. An IPO
is dated by the year that a firm enters the CRSP database, but we include its net capital stock
(from Compustat) in our series for yreal only if the firm joins Compustat in the same year. We do
this because the firm coverage of Compustat expanded as balance sheet data became available for
particular firms, and this does not necessarily correspond to the year of IPO. Since CRSP includes
all firms listed on the NYSE, the AMEX after 1962, and NASDAQ after 1972, the correspondence
between entry year and IPO is reliable for all years other than 1962 and 1972, when existing AMEX
and NASDAQ firms entered CRSP en masse. The 1962 and 1972 values in Figure 3 are for this
reason interpolated, and are excluded from the regression analysis. We also exclude ADRs, which
are indirect listings of large foreign firms through U.S. banks. Since most ADRs either were listed
previously in other countries or from countries where a formal IPO was not possible, their inclusion
would distort our analysis of the factors that influence the listing behavior of U.S. firms.
11Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) report this figure at closer to 30 percent.
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Figure 3: Gross investment per incumbent as a share of net capital, xreal, and average
entering capital of IPOs, yreal, in millions of 2001 dollars, 1955-2001.
1969-70 recessions. If anything, incumbent investment seems to lead investment by
new firms, with the highest cross-correlation between series of 0.124 obtaining for
(yreal,t, xreal,t−1).
Figure 4 shows the Tobin’s Q proxied by average market-to-book ratios from
Compustat after adjusting book values for inflation.12 We represent Q∗, or the con-
tinuation value of Q in (6), with the one-year lag of this series.13
Table 1 shows the regressions, which include a linear time trend. The left panel
shows that the average investment of newly-listed firms is sensitive to Q∗ − 1, and
12In our model a firm’s average Q is the same as its market-to-book ratio, but the two may in
fact diverge significantly due to the eﬀects of changing tax rates on market values and depreciation
on book values. Since these adjustments would aﬀect firms and investors diﬀerently and over time,
we prefer to derive market-to-book ratios directly from our micro-based balance sheet data.
13To compute market values using Compustat, we start with common equity at current share
prices (the product of items 24 and 25) and add in the book value of preferred stock (item 130)
and short- and long-term debts (items 34 and 9). Book values are computed similarly, but with
the book value of common equity (item 60) rather than market value. We omit observations with
market-to-book ratios in excess of 100, since most are likely to be data errors.
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Figure 4: Tobin’s Q as proxied by average market-to-book ratios, 1955-2001.
Table 1. Regressions of the Average Investment of New
Listings (yreal) and Incumbents (xreal) on Q∗, 1955-2001.
Dependent variable
ln(yreal) ln(yreal) ln(xreal) ln(xreal)
ln(Q∗ − 1) 0.668 0.637 0.042 0.044
(4.87) (4.63) (0.76) (0.77)
rt -0.063 0.004
(-1.37) (0.19)
trend 0.021 0.025 -0.006 -0.006
(3.38) (3.67) (-2.37) (-2.19)
constant 3.827 3.871 -1.857 -1.859
(20.80) (20.94) (-25.15) (-24.51)
R2 .441 .466 .138 .139
N 44 44 44 44
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
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      Figure 5.   Scatterplots of regressions of the average investment of new stock
           market listings (yreal) and incumbents (xreal) on Tobin’s Q, 1955-2001.  
that this relationship is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This implies
that firms tend to float larger IPOs when Q is high than when it is lower. In the right
panel, the coeﬃcients on Q∗−1 are not statistically significant, suggesting that the Q
is not an important determinant of growth in the capital stock among going concerns.
Further, the liquidity of the capital market, as measured by the commercial paper rate
(rt), has a coeﬃcient in the yreal regression which, while not statistically significant,
is negative with a t-statistic that does exceed unity. This is consistent with larger
IPOs occurring when interest rates are low. The coeﬃcient on rt is positive but very
small and not statistically significant in the xreal regression.
Figure 5 contains scatterplots of the regressions reported in Table 1 that exclude
the commercial paper rate. We use the estimated coeﬃcients on the linear trend
terms to de-trend yreal and xreal before plotting them against Q∗ − 1.
6.2 Regressions with financial aggregates Y/K and X/K
In this section we measure y as the total real value of IPOs in each year and x as
the total value of seasoned oﬀerings (SEO’s), both as percentages of the net stock of
private capital in the United States.14 We denote these variables by yfin and xfin.
Since n = z2K, if z2 were a constant rather than a random variable, normalization
of IPO volumes by either n (to get averages) or K (to obtain ratios) would both be
consistent with the theory. Figure 6 show the series for xfin and yfin, once again with
NBER recessions shaded. Dashed lines denote interpolations between missing values
Over this longer period, IPOs fall during 8 of 12 recessions, while seasoned oﬀerings
fall during only 6 of them.
6.2.1 Using Q’s from Compustat
Table 2 presents our findings for 1955-2001. Figure 7 shows scatterplots of the re-
gressions. Similarly to our findings with the average sizes of new entrants and the
growth of incumbents’ capital, the log of IPO volume as a percentage of total capital
responds positively to the log of Q∗ − 1 at the one percent level, while Q∗ − 1 is
not a statistically significant determinant of seasoned oﬀerings. When we add the
real commercial paper to the specifications, it is positive and significant in the IPO
regression but not statistically significant in the SEO regression. This finding reflects
the tendency for interest rates to rise as the business cycle matures, and for firms to
delay their IPOs hoping to time the market.
14IPO volumes are gross proceeds from Ritter (2003, Table 5, p. 6) for 1975-2001, to which we
ratio-splice the year-end market value of common equity for firms that entered the CRSP database
in each year from 1927-1974. Ritter’s data are from the database made available by the Securities
Data Corporation. Seasoned oﬀerings are proceeds for U.S. equity issues from 1927-2001 (using data
underlying Baker and Wurgler (2000), who collected it from various issues of the Federal Reserve
Bulletin) less IPOs as defined above. We deflate IPOs and seasoned oﬀerings using the implicit price
deflator for GDP.
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Figure 6: IPO’s and SEO’s as percentages of the total U.S. capital stock, 1927-2001.
Table 2. Regressions of IPO (yfin) and SEO (xfin) volume as
percentages of the U.S. capital stock on Q∗, 1955-2001.
Dependent variable
ln(yfin) ln(yfin) ln(xfin) ln(xfin)
ln(Q∗ − 1) 1.111 1.211 -0.033 -0.045
(5.42) (6.44) (-0.36) (-0.48)
rt 0.206 -0.025
(3.21) (-0.76)
trend 0.059 0.045 0.016 0.018
(6.43) (4.88) (3.96) (3.85)
constant -4.108 -4.251 -1.738 -1.721
(-15.48) (-17.41) (-14.36) (-13.91)
R2 .606 .685 .278 .288
N 45 45 45 45
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Figure 8: MCAP/GDP , 1927-2001, and Tobin’s Q, 1955-2001.
6.2.2 Using the ratio of stock market value to GDP as a proxy for Q
Given that the series for the value of seasoned oﬀerings is available from 1927, it
would be useful to have a continuous measure of Q that also goes back that far. But
using Compustat limits the coverage to 1955-2001. Because of this, we next work
with the de-trended ratio of stock market capitalization to output, which is available
continuously from before 1927, as a proxy for Q. This measure will be a noisier
measure of Q∗ than Q itself, and the estimate of β in Eqs. (12) and (13) will be
biased towards zero. We start by getting residual ut from the regression
MCapt
GDPt
= a+ bt+ ut.
Defining the simple mean of MCaptGDPt as µ, we then set
Q∗t = µ+ ut−1.
Figure 8 includes the series, along with ourQ’s as measured with the available Compu-
stat data. Since the former does not always exceed unity, we run regressions without
subtracting one from Q∗ before taking logs.
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Table 3. Regressions of IPOs (yfin) and SEOs (xfin) as percent
of K with Mcap/GDP as a proxy for Q∗, 1955-2001.
Dependent variable
ln(yfin) ln(yfin) ln(xfin) ln(xfin)
ln(Q∗) 0.710 0.845 -0.061 -0.080
(2.64) (3.23) (-0.60) (-0.76)
rt 0.195 -0.027
(2.38) (-0.84)
trend 0.054 0.041 0.017 0.018
(4.92) (3.46) (4.02) (3.93)
constant -3.791 -3.823 -1.789 -1.784
(-9.14) (-9.71) (-11.45) (-11.37)
R2 .426 .495 .282 .295
N 45 45 45 45
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Table 3 presents the findings using data from 1955-2001 only. We do this to
compare the results with our new measure of Q∗ based on stock market capitalization
to those obtained in Table 2 using estimates of Q∗ based on firm-level data. Figure 9
includes scatterplots of the regressions that exclude the commercial paper rate. The
results in the yfin regressions are weaker with the new proxy for Q, but the coeﬃcients
on Q∗ remain statistically significant at the five percent level. The xfin regressions
continue to show negative but not statistically significant coeﬃcients on Q∗. The
commercial paper rate (rt) remains marginally significant in the yfin equation and
not significant in the yfin equation.
We now proceed to estimate our investment equations with the new proxy for Q
over the full 1927-2001 period. The results, shown in Table 4, are qualitatively the
same as for the 1955-2001 period, though the coeﬃcients on the log of Q∗ are a bit
smaller in the yfin equations. They remain statistically significant, however, at the
five percent level. The commercial paper rate is no longer statistically significant,
though it remains positive. Once again, Q∗ is not significant in the xfin equations.
Figure 10 presents the scatterplots.
In terms of the parameters in Eqs. 12 and 13 in the model, our regression results
imply that γ is indeed much larger than µ. If we use our estimate of 1.2 for the
coeﬃcient on the log of Q∗ − 1 from Table 2 as the elasticity of IPO value, this
implies a value of 1.833 for µ. If we use the estimate of 0.637 from Table 1, this
implies that µ is about 2.6. On the other hand, the largest coeﬃcient estimate that
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Table 4. Regressions of IPOs (yfin) and SEOs (xfin) as
percent of K with Mcap/GDP as a proxy for Q∗, 1927-2001.
Dependent variable
ln(yfin) ln(yfin) ln(xfin) ln(xfin)
ln(Q∗) 0.688 0.622 -0.063 -0.106
(2.67) (2.35) (-0.34) (-0.56)
rt 0.039 0.026
(1.12) (1.03)
trend 0.035 0.033 0.012 0.011
(5.71) (5.28) (2.73) (2.40)
constant -4.260 -4.328 -2.009 -2.054
(-11.75) (-11.79) (-7.80) (-7.87)
R2 .351 .362 .102 .116
N 72 72 72 72
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
we obtain on the log of Q∗ − 1 is only 0.042 (from Table 1), and this implies a value
of nearly 25 for γ.
We can also compare the actual coeﬃcients that we obtain on Q∗ − 1 with those
reported by Hayashi (1982) for regressions of firm-level investment on Q. His coeﬃ-
cient of 0.045 is only slightly larger than the largest coeﬃcient of 0.042 obtained in
our x regressions. In our y regressions, however, the coeﬃcients of 1.211 and 0.637
on Q∗ − 1 are 27 and 14 times larger, respectively, than those obtained by Hayashi.
Although he used firm level data and we use aggregate time series here, it is striking
how close our coeﬃcients for incumbent investment match Hayashi’s findings for firms
generally, and how much more responsive new investment is to fluctuations in Q.
6.3 Regressions with the number of IPOs
At the end of Section 5, we mentioned that the structural equation (11) implies a
zero relation between Q and n. On the other hand, n raises the marginal product
of capital and, if this raises the interest rate, will lower Q∗. The deterministic case,
at least, and equations (14), and (19), predict a negative relation as a comparative
steady-state outcome. To check this, we build a series for the number of IPOs from
1927-2001 using Ritter (2003, Table 5, p. 6) for 1975-2001, and ratio-splicing the
18
19
0.1 1 10
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
ln(yfin) = -4.260 + .688 ln(Q*)
  (-11.8)    (2.7)   R2=.35
Q*
0.1 1 10
0.01
0.1
1
10
ln(xfin) = -2.009 - .063 ln(Q)
   (-7.8)   (-0.3)     R2=.28
Q*
      Figure 9.   Scatterplots of regressions of the IPO value (yfin) and SEO value (xfin)  
           as percentages of the U.S. capital stock on MCAP/GDP, 1927-2001.
number of new listings on the CRSP database from 1927-74.15
Table 5 presents the regressions. The coeﬃcient on Q∗ − 1 is not statistically
significant for 1955-2001 in the first column, and the coeﬃcient on Q as measured by
Mcap/GDP is not significant for the 1927-2001 period either. In all cases, however,
the sign is negative, and is even statistically significant in the second column for
1955-2001. This confirms the prediction of the model.
Table 5. Regressions of the number of IPOs (n) on Q∗ − 1 and
with Mcap/GDP as a proxy for Q∗.
Dependent variable: n
1955-2001 1955-2001 1927-2001
ln(Q∗ − 1) -0.164
(-1.09)
ln(MCAP/GDP ) -0.519 -0.314
(-3.53) (-1.48)
rt 0.211 0.185 0.103
(4.12) (4.03) (3.67)
trend 0.111 0.114 0.083
(15.02) (17.20) (16.58)
constant 0.507 0.053 -0.990
(2.59) (0.24) (-3.35)
R2 .905 .925 .835
N 45 45 72
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
7 Long-run growth when z is constant
This is an endogenous growth model. The growth rate is random and depends on z.
But we can solve for it when z is constant. We are interested in how the growth rate
depends on the adjustment cost parameters, especially the parameters of C∗. Let
U (c) = 1
1− σc
1−σ.
15We obtain similar results using the number of new listings on CRSP for the entire 1927-2001
period instead of the Ritter-CRSP figures. The two series have a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.96.
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Let g be the long-run growth rate of consumption. If g is constant, it must equal the
rate of growth of capital x+ κy − δ, i.e.,
g = x+ z2y − δ. (14)
Then (6) gives us
Q∗ = β (1 + g)−σ Q, (15)
The FOCs (7) and (9) read
C 0 (x) = Q∗ − 1, (16)
and
C∗0 (y) = Q∗ − 1. (17)
With (5), we have 5 equations in the 5 unknowns (g, x, y,Q,Q∗).
We first use (5) and (15) to eliminate Q and solve for Q∗:
Q = z1 − C (x)− x+ (1− δ + x)β (1 + g)−σQ =⇒ (18)
Q∗ = β (1 + g)
−σ (z1 − C (x)− x)
1− (1− δ + x) β (1 + g)−σ
, (19)
which reduces the system to 4 equations (14), (16), (17), and (19) in the 4 unknowns
(g, x, y,Q∗) .
7.0.1 Special case when σ = 0
Let U (c) = c. Then (1 + g)−σ = 1 and the system becomes recursive so that (x,Q∗)
do not depend on the form of C∗ (y). We can first solve for x and Q∗, and then we
can get y. Noting that now and Q∗ = βQ, the 2 equations are (16) and
Q∗ = z − C (x)− x
β−1 − (1− δ + x)
,
They reduce to a single equation in x:
1 + C 0 (x) = z − C (x)− x
β−1 − (1− δ + x)
.
Neither x nor Q∗ depends on the parameters of C∗. Let us assume K0 = 1, a
harmless normalization. The growth rate is
g = x− δ + z2y.
Therefore we simply need to solve for y as a function of µ which only y depends on.
Solve (17)
y = (C∗0)−1 (Q∗ − 1) .
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So, if we change the parameters of C∗ without changing anything else, we aﬀect the
growth rate solely through the entry of new capital at a faster rate. Suppose
C∗ (y) = 1θy
λ =⇒ y = θλ (Q
∗ − 1)1/(λ−1) .
Here θ can be thought of as the financial development parameter. We can choose z
so that Q∗ is about 1.3 and set λ = 2. Then
y = (0.15) θ
Therefore the growth rate would be
g = x− δ + (0.15) z2θ
Since x does not depend on θ,
dg
dθ = (0.15) z2.
Financial development and growth.–A lower C∗ may reflect the presence of ana-
lysts, investment bankers, venture capitalists and stock-market traders — people that
predominate in financially developed countries. Because of the relative novelty of the
ideas and technologies of new firms and the human-capital intensity of evaluating
their prospects, it is probable that countries diﬀer more in their C∗’s than they do in
their C’s. At a stretch one could link this model to the data on financial development
and growth.
8 Other issues
Other evidence on entrants vs. incumbents.–The question of when we may expect
to see more IPOs is a part of the more general question of when we should expect
entrants to outperform incumbents or to gain market share. Chirinko and Schaller
(1995) find investment of mature firms responds more to Q than investment of young
firms. Since IPO-ing firms are young, this evidence runs counter to ours. On the other
hand, business cycle research reveals an elastic movement of labor at the extensive
margin (i.e., employment) compared to the intensive margin (i.e., hours per worker).
This agrees with our findings that entrants respond more to Q than do incumbents.
But then again, Boeri and Cramer (1992) find that incumbent firms accommodate
the bulk of cyclical fluctuations whereas entrants account more for the low-frequency
movements in employment. On the whole, the evidence is mixed.
Thick-market externalities and IPO waves.–A mechanism that would amplify the
eﬀects of shocks on investment is the presence of thick-market externalities: Pecu-
niary (Shleifer 1986) and non-pecuniary (Diamond 1982, Pagano 1989 and Veldcamp
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2003). They may explain why C∗ is less convex than C when considered a function
of aggregate y.16 They would bring a second external eﬀect into the model.
9 Conclusion
We found that the Q-theory of investment explains IPOs rather well. It does a
better job with the investment of entering firms than it does with the investment
of incumbents, in the sense that entering firms responds much more elastically to Q
than do incumbents. The response is real, not merely financial.
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10 Appendix
10.1 The equilibrium saving decision
Asset markets.–We assume only a stock market. A household owns shares of firms,
and dividends are its only income. The number of households is normalized to unity.
Because K grows over time, let us define shares in terms of pieces of capital rather
than firms. That is, let N be the number of units of incumbent capital that the
household owns. The ex-dividend price of a share of incumbent capital is Q∗. The
price of an IPO-ing firm is also Q∗. Right after the incumbents have paid their divi-
dends, their shares become perfect substitutes with the shares of the entrants. Since
Q∗ depends only on z we can write the budget constraint as follows:
c+Q∗ (z) (N 0 −N) = (z1 − x [z]− C [x (z)])N (20)
≡ φ (z)N.
In this budget constraint we have inserted the incumbent firms’ equilibrium invest-
ment decisions x [z].
The savings problem.–The consumer’s state is (z,N) , and his Bellman equation
is
w (z,N) = max
N 0
½
U [φ (z)N −Q∗ (z) (N 0 −N)] + β
Z
w (z0, N 0) dF (z0, z)
¾
. (21)
The FOC is
−U 0 (c)Q∗ (z) + β
Z
w2 (z0,N 0) dF (z0, z) . (22)
Now the envelope theorem gives us
w2 (z,N) = U 0 (c) [φ (z) +Q∗ (z)] (23)
which, with (22) implies
Q∗ (z) = β
Z U 0 (c0)
U 0 (c) [φ (z
0) +Q∗ (z0)] dF (z0, z) .
which along with (5) and (6) implies (10).
Savings = Investment.–Define the optimal consumption and savings policies by
c = ψc (z,N) and N 0 = ψN (z,N) .
Equilibrium requires that N = K, and we ask that equilibrium actions respect this
identity. This will occur if
ψN (z,K) = (1− δ + x [z] + z2y [z]K0)K. (24)
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10.2 The planner’s problem
The planner’s problem is described by the following Bellman equation
v (z,K) = max
x,y,K0
½
U ([z1 − x− z2yK0 − C (x)− z2C∗ (y)K0]K) + β
Z
v (z0,K 0) dF (z0, z)
¾
s.t.
[1− δ + x+ z2yK0]K = K 0 (25)
This constraint can be solved for x:
x = K
0
K − z2yK0 − 1 + δ.
Eliminating x, the Bellman equation now reads
v (z,K) = max
y,K0
½
U
¡£
z1 + 1− δ − C
¡K0
K − z2yK0 − 1 + δ
¢
− z2C∗ (y)K0
¤
K −K 0
¢
+β
R
v (z0, K 0) dF (z0, z) .
¾
(26)
The planner’s FOC’s.–Diﬀerentiating in (26) with respect to y, we obtain the
first necessary condition for the planner’s optimum:
C 0 (x)− C∗0 (y) = 0. (27)
Comparing this with (7) and (9) we see that the planner also equates the marginal
costs of the two kinds of investment. This is because the external eﬀects of x and y
are the same.
Diﬀerentiating in (26) with respect to K 0,
U 0 (c) [1 + C 0 (x)] = β
Z
v2 (z0, K 0) dF (z0, z)
which is to be compared to (22) which, when combined with (7), reads
−U 0 (c) [1 + C 0 (x)] = β
Z
w2 (z0, N 0) dF (z0, z) .
The external eﬀect creates a divergence between w2 (z,K), the equilibrium incen-
tive to save and v2 (z,K), the planner’s incentive to save. According to [23], the
equilibrium incentive at N = K is
w2 (z,K) = U 0 (c) [φ (z) +Q∗ (z)] ,
where
φ (z) = (z1 − x [z]− C [x (z)]) and Q∗ (z) = 1 + C 0 (x) ,
i.e.,
w2 (z,K) = U 0 (c) [z1 − x− C (x) + 1 + C 0 (x)] .
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To calculate the planner’s incentive, we use the envelope condition in (26) to conclude
that
v2 (z,K) = U 0 (c)
·
z1 + 1− δ − C (x)− z2C∗ (y)K0 + C 0 (x)
K 0
K
¸
. (28)
Proposition 1 For all z for which x (z) > δ, then
v2 (z,K) > w2 (z,K) .
Proof. From (25) and (28),
v2 (z,K) = U 0 (c) [z1 + 1− δ − C (x)− z2C∗ (y) + C 0 (x) (1− δ + x+ z2yK0)]
= U 0 (c) [z1 − C (x) + 1 + C 0 (x)− x+ x− δ − z2C∗ (y)K0 + C 0 (x) (−δ + x+ z2yK0)]
= w2 (z,K) + U 0 (c) [x− δ − z2C∗ (y)K0 + C 0 (x) (−δ + x+ z2yK0)]
= w2 (z,K) + U 0 (c) ((x− δ)C 0 (x)− z2 [C∗ (y)− yC 0 (x)])K0
= w2 (z,K) + U 0 (c) [z2 [yC∗0 (y)− C∗ (y)]K0 + (x− δ)C 0 (x)]
using (27). By the convexity of C∗, yC∗0 (y)− C∗ (y) > 0, and the claim follows.
The condition x (z) > δ is suﬃcient but not necessary, and so the converse is not
necessarily true. If δ = 0, however, the inequality holds in all states and then the
Proposition implies that the planner would prefer a higher growth rate in all states.
Finally, this welfare result concerns capital creation in general, and not new-firm
capital in particular.
10.3 Descriptive statistics for the data
In this appendix we present descriptive statistics for the data used in our analysis
over the period from 1955 to 2001. Table 6 presents the time series means, standard
deviations, and annual trend growth rates. Table 7 presents the correlations of the
data after de-trending each series.
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics, 1955-2001
mean std. deviation trend growth (%)
yreal 73.6 65.2 4.10
yfin .091 .096 6.36
xreal .135 .031 -0.63
xfin .286 .121 0.81
Q∗ 1.73 .396 0.81
M/GDP .412 .266 4.58
rreal 2.57 2.03
n 165 198 8.53
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Table 7. Correlations for the De-trended Series, 1955-2001
yreal yfin xreal xfin Q∗ M/GDP rreal n
yreal 1
yfin .332 1
xreal .240 -.045 1
xfin -.066 -.019 -.179 1
Q∗ .609 .528 .222 -.047 1
M/GDP .847 .352 .290 .056 .794 1
rreal -.238 -.127 -.020 -.082 -.101 -.218 1
n -.252 .414 -.264 .318 .031 -.278 .171 1
In the tables yreal is the average investment of new stock market listings, xreal is
the average investment of incumbents, yfin is the value of IPOs as a percentage of
the U.S. capital stock, xfinis the value of seasoned oﬀerings as a percentage of the
U.S. capital stock, and rreal is the real commercial paper rate.
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